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Most mathematicians and philosophers
consider number to be a primitive concept.
That is, the concept of number cannot be
reduced to or identified with any concept
that is more primitive. The idea of number
cannot be further defined with words
whose most immediate intuitive meaning is
more obvious or basic than the word num-
ber. This, coupled with the fact that
number is an abstract entity which cannot
be observed, felt, or handled in a concrete
way, gives rise to diverse theories of the
structure of number.
In most mathematics discussions this
difficulty is pointed out rather vaguely or
entirely overlooked. Attempts to clarify
the number structure fall into two broad
categories. Some define natural numbers
as the process of counting, a process inde-
pendent of time and space and an imme-
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c) Measuring number: if a
magnitude is measured, it is
exhausted or tried to be ex-
hausted by means of copies
of a unit, like a vessel is
emptied with a scoop.
d) Reckoning number: this
is the algorithmic aspect.
The number is operationally
comprehended, by rules ac-
cording to which the user
plays with it.2
Both approaches give inadequate an-
swers to the question: What is number? If
number is only a creation of the human
mind, then is there no structure to this
concept other than that democratically
agreed upon by mathematicians through
the ages? If number is defined to be an
ordinal number, cardinal number, rational
diate result of the laws of thought. As
Dedekind states: "Numbers are the free
creations of the human mind.'" Others
say that natural numbers are a created
something which to be explained require
other related experiences. Hans Freuden-
thal, for example, describes this concept
as follows:
The singular 'number concept' is
misleading. There are many num-
ber concepts, both as regards
content and form, from method-
ological, genetic and didactic
viewpoints. A rough distinction
of the access to the number con-
cept would be:
a) Counting number: to be-
gin with, this is the reeling
off in time of the sequence
of natura~ numbers. The
first steps of which are as
arduous for children as learn-
ing the names of colours
and letters, until they sud-
denly grasp the whole un-
limitedly continuing se-
quence. A conceptual sei-
zure that has no analogue in
learning the names of co-
lours and letters.
b) Numerosity number: per-
haps the numerosity number
is genetically earlier than
the counting number. Ani-
mals recognize small numer-
osities though they certainly
cannot count.
number, or an element of a ring or field
axiomatically fixed, then again the question:
What is number? has no clear precise
answer, but hinges upon the way the con-
cept is used. It then becomes a relative
concept.
The purpose of this paper is to give a
succinct, brief analysis of the essence of
number. This analysis does not replace or
contradict the theories discussed above, but
is an attempt to get at a biblically based
prior concept out of which the theory of
numbers can be developed.
Before undertaking this analysis, there
are three basic givens which set the per-
spective for this discussion. First, on the
basis of a faith comm itment and without
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the universe. Number was considered the
basic counting unit, the basic geometric
unit, and the basic physical unit. (We now
identify the latter two as point and atom or
element respectively.) Through further
theoretic and scientific developments, it
became apparent that the entities number,
point, and atom were not identical.
\ Arithmetic for the Greeks was basically
a discrete, finite theory, and problems arose
when points on a line were matched on a
one-to-one basis with the points on a longer
line (leno's Paradox) or when diagonals of
squares were measured with the same units
as those used to measure the side of the
same square.
The problem they overlooked was that
number is a distinct entity not reducible to
other equally irreducible entities. The fol-
lowing may illustrate this point. The sym-
bol 1 standing alone conveys an immediate
concept to each observer in western culture.
If, however, this symbol is associated with
each of the following-(1,-), (1,!:J.), (1,0)-
the most immediate concept is different in
each of the three symbols. Even though
these three entities all have a measu re of 1,
the line segment, the triangle, and the
square each adds a new and distinct dimen-
sion to the concept which the symbol 1,
alone, cannot convey. By way of contra-
diction, one might argue that if the symbol
1 were sufficient to represent all three
further argument, we will assume that
number is a created entity, not merely
a result of man's ingenuity. Second, we
believe that the number aspect is not an
arbitrary structure, but is, like all of creation
subject to law. Number was ordained to be
number by the Creator, who also sustains
this identity within the creation even though
there is considerable diversity and confusion
within human experience and culture as to
its precise meaning. Third, number is,
always has been, and will continue to be a
distinct aspect of the creation distinguish-
able from all other basic entities in the
creation in at least one fundamental re-
spect. Equivalently, number is an irre-
ducible aspect of the creation.
From the history of mathematics and
a study of the development of number in
the various civilizations and cultures, it
becomes quite obvious that the idea of
number was not always as we know it
today. This should not be surprising, as
it is a direct corollary of the cultural
mandate. If man was given the command
to work in the creation, there certainly
would be work to do and something to
develop.
Man from the time of creation appar-
ently had a very naive number sense and
could intlJit the equivalence relation, a
one-to-one or counting relation, between
a pile of stones and a flock of sheep, for
example. At some point in time, however,
it first occurred to man to make a symbol
to represent this number rather than a pile
of stones. This could be considered the first
step of abstracting. Such insights did not
completely exhaust the meaning and char-
acter of number nor the extent of its use-
fulness. The exploration of the quantitative
relations which exist in the creation and
impose themselves on man in his cultural
activities continued.
In the area of mathematics, the Greeks
were the first civilization to develop an
abstract, structured, mathematical, philoso-
phical, and scientific system. To them,
number was the most basic unit of a
substance. They held this view because
mathematics to them was the language of
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All of these examples point out the
fact that we live in, are part of, and respond
to a creation where distinctions are possible
and are consciously or unconsciously made
to avoid confusion. The reasons for these
distinctions cannot always be proven logi-
cally or derived, but are often an intuitive
response to a matter of fact. The history
of natural science and mathematics gives
many examples of where not making such
distinctions has resulted in confusion and
loss of direction in the development of the
science.
ideas, they should be distinguishable solely
on that basis. Obviously they are not.
Therefore, there is a different aspect enter-
ing the discussion, namely the size and
shape of the space enclosed. In other
words, the number concept cannot com-
pletely describe the amount of information
contained in a discussion about space. A
unit of measurement is one way of account-
ing for this distinct aspect.
The development of measuring units
has a long history and is closely tied to the
theories of science. But even in the labels
Only man has the ability to abstract
and symbolize number, but experiments
with animals show that the numerical sense
is not unique to man. It is a created entity
evidenced in many ways in the creation.
Some plants show a unique number rela-
tion, called the Fibonnaci Sequence in the
number of leaves and branches the plant
develops and their relative positions on the
plant. Robins usually lay four eggs. Exper-
imenters have removed one egg from the
nest and the mother robin lays another,
repeatedly. Even though the conclusions
are controversial and other plausible ex-
planations might be offered, there is ac-
cumulated a mass of evidence supporting
the belief that certain birds, certain mam-
mals, and certain arthropods perhaps have
a number sense. The following anecdote
may more directly illustrate the point.
There is a touching and authentic
story about a bird that seemed to
possess a number sense. A squire
used to identify the units of time, space,
velocity, and force, to name just a few, we
see evidence of the irreducibility of one
creational aspect to that of another. This
the Greeks did not recognize.
In arithmetic, that is, in operations
with numerals, number symbols, we need
no units description. One object is repre-
sented by the symbol 1. But in geometry,
the science of space, we commonly assign
very specific types of units such as 1 inch,
1 square foot, or 1 cubic yard, to name
only a few. When studying physical pheno-
mena-that is, when mass is involved-we
customarily use a different set of units, such
as 1 pound, 1 gram, or similar weight or
mass units. The units change again for the
study of the motion of a point. Here we
use 1 inch per second or 1 mile per hour
and so on; and the units change once more
as we discuss the r:notion of a mass-particle,
when the units used are 1 foot-pound per
second or 1 dyne, newton, or horsepower.
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try to impose mathematical concepts on a
child prematurely, his learning is merely
verbal; true understanding of them comes
only with his mental growth.,,4 From this
statement, which summarizes most parents'
experiences when teaching a child how to
count, it is quite obvious that the raw
material for the development of the num-
ber concept is inherently present before the
child is ready to handle the concept ab-
stractly. Many types of experiments have
been conducted which~how that a child can
carry out the basic counting process, setting
a one-to-one correspondence between ob-
jects, before that child can verbalize, or
through rational action, illustrate the pro-
cess.
We always deal with numbers abstract-
Iy, and attempts to make the idea concrete
fail because there is no specific thing which
can be identified uniquely with the concept
number. It is for this reason that number
is so very difficult to describe. This is not
the case for the other basic mathematical
concepts. A point in space, for example,
can be illustrated as the place where two
walls and the ceiling of a room meet. This
concretizes the concept of point. But there
is no such representation of number.
This problem is bothersome to mathe-
maticians in general and can be summarized
by the following statement by Kuyk:
The question whether it is possi-
ble to make some kind of onto-
logy the basis of modern mathe-
matics is left open by most peo-
ple working in the mathematical
fields. Fearing to introduce into
mathematics arguments of a meta-
physical nature, the philosophi-
cally minded mathematician will
avoid as much as possible refer-
ence to mathematical existence
independent of human thought.
In general it can be said that
under the impact of the prag-
matist attitude, for the philoso-
pher of mathematics the worka-
ability of mathematical systems
rather than their interpretability
has become a central point of
in Scot!and became annoyed by
a raucous crow that had made its
nest in the watchtower of his
estate, and he determined to
shoot the bird. Repeatedly he
tried to enter the tower to kill
the bird, but each time at the
man's approach the crow would
leave its nest and take up a
watchful position in a distant
tree. When the wearied squire
would leave the tower, the bird
would return to its nest. Not
wishing to be outsmarted by a
bird, the squire resor~ed to a
ruse. He secured the assistance
of a neighbor one day. The two
men entered the tower,' one man
came out and went away, and
the other remair1ed within. But
the crow was not deceived; it
stayed in the distant tree until
the man within the tower came
out. The experiment now be-
came a contest, and the next
day three men entered the tower,
two came out and went away,
and the third waited within. But
the crow was not fooled; it
remained il:l the distant tree until
the man within the tower came
out. The next day the experi-
ment was repeated with fou r
men, but still without success.
Finally five men entered the
tower, four came out and went
away, and the fifth remained
inside. At this point the crow
seemed to have lost count and,
unable to distinguish between
four and five, it returned to its
nest in the tower.3
To develop further background and
insight into the essence of number, we look
at how children learn numbers. Piaget says,
"It is a great mistake to suppose that a
child acquires the notion of number and
other mathematical concepts just from
teaching. On the contrary, to a remarkable
degree he develops them himself, inde-
pendently and spontaneously. When adults
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view. Reflections of an episte-
mological nature as well as reflec-
tions regarding for example
mathematical truth are not readily
undertaken by mathematicians
of the pragmatistic type.5
To break with the usual ontology of
number, whether intu itionistic, logistic, or
formalistic, it will be necessary to recognize
first that the idea of natural number
cannot be defined. The concept of the
natural number "one" cannot be reduced
to or identified with any concept that is
more primitive. Moreover, we will recog-
nize the existence of number independent
formed the cosmos and each rock, plant,
and creature in it, he was concerned with
the details of His creation. I mplicit in the
"And God saw that it was good," is the
identification of each of the products of His
handiwork and the knowledge of what it
was. Explicit in the "All according to their
kind" is the fact of differentiation, dis-
tinction, and distinguishability. These two
phrases carry with them the very direct
message of identity. Whatever was created,
was done so according to the way in which
God intended it, and could never be other-
wise. With this attribute present in the
creation, it is possible to make distinctions,
selections, and choices.
Fundamentally, the aspect of the num-
ber "one" is abstracted, through identifica-
tion and selection, from an integral object
in the horizon of immediate experience, in
distinction from all other aspects of that
object. Very simply, it is the process of
saying "this one" and not "that one."
Piaget expands on this as follows:
In analysing the beginnings of
quantification, we find ourselves
confronted with the problem of
correspondence. To compare two
quantities is indeed either to
compare their dimensions, or to
make a one-to-one correspond-
ence between the elements. As a
result of the work of Cantor, the
second of these processes has
been seen to be fundamental to
the construction of the integer,
since it provides the simplest and
most direct measurement of the
equivalence of two sets.6
Identification of a single object carries
with it the number one. Repeated identifi-
cations give rise to correspondences and,
hence, to the construction of the integers.
The reason for discussing the number con-
cept in terms of the number "one" is that
most discussions of this type begin with
two or more and then attempt to define the
process of counting and also numbers in
terms of classification sets or equivalent
sets. This brings one too quickly to the
process of counting, without clearly illus-
of human thought. Number is a concept
integral to the whole of creation and man
structures this and other mathematical con-
cepts appropriately only when he does so
according to the laws placed in the creation
by the Creator.
Since number is a primitive concept,
our discussion of what is number cannot be
further refined by definition, but will have
to take the form of ontology by creation
laws or norms. The concept of number can
only be recognized as existing, and hence as
mathematical truth, because it was created
so, and it can be described only in terms of
a set of boundaries or laws beyond which
the entity ceases to be number.
Within this context, I believe, the idea
of number derives its meaning out of the
created fact of identity. When the Creator
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I n the area of pedagogical methods in
arithmetic, we note that set theory per se
cannot and will not be the basis for number
concepts. Number concepts and the arith-
metic operations of numbers can be clari-
fied and illustrated by using sets, but not
defined or derived from set theory. This
may be one of the problems associated
with the so-called "new math" programs,
where sets are made the basis for the
number concept, rather than a method of
illustrating this concept.
Even though the number concept is
very difficult to define and discuss and has
eluded mathematicians and philosophers
over the centuries, we should not hesitate
to clarify this concept. Number is a part of
God's creation given to us to use to His
glory. If we make number abstract and
elusive, when it is in fact a very naive and
intuitive sense given to man to use, we are
remiss in overlooking its simple beauty. If
we keep this in mind,. however, we may well
increase the effectiveness of our service to
God and our fellowman.
FOOTNOTES
trating the concept of number. The pre-
vious quotation of Piaget and the following
of Richard Copeland illustrate this tendency.
Classification is based on proper-
ties shared in common by a set of
objects such as size, shape, color,
or warm-blooded. Number is
also a property of any class or
set of objects. We may compare
sets of objects and say that they
have the same number or the
same number property. But
number, unlike the objects them-
selves is abstract.7
Here the concept, number, is charac-
terized as a property associated with all
sets having the same property. This some-
what nebulous statement again relativizes
the structure of number.
. Viewed, however, as repeated identi-
fications of integral objects of one set
compared or put into correspondence with
integral objects of another set, the process
of counting now takes the form of con-
structing a sequence of symbols in which
each successor is one more than its pre-
decessor. In this process, the number one
becomes the basic unit, which, as I have
attempted to show, is the focal point of
this analysis. The expanded structures of
negative numbers, ratiohal numbers, and
irrational numbers do not change signifi-
cantly with this approach. The argument
is more meta-mathematical than it is mathe-
matical.
It must be noted, too, that we make an
error if we assume number and identity to
be coterminus or even equivalent. The
implication should be clear that while
number exists because things can be identi-
fied and distinguished, the converse is
not necessarily true. Number is an element
of the set of all methods of identification.
It is only one such method and does not
includ~ all other methods. This is a
common error made in society today,
where quantification and number identi-
fication are made the goal of an efficient
society, such as the social security number,
implicitly assumed to be a requisite for
full citizenship.
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